While folk theorems for dynamic renewable common pool resource games sustain cooperation as an equilibrium, the possibility of reverting to violence to appropriate the resource destroys the incentives to cooperate because of the expectation of conflict when resources are sufficiently depleted. In this paper we show with experimental evidence that agents behave according to the theoretical predictions. For high stocks of resources when conflict is a highly costly activity, participants cooperate less than in the control group, and they play the non-cooperative action with higher frequency. This comes as a consequence of the (correct) anticipation that when resources run low, the conflict option is used by a large share of participants.
some degree through time. In such dynamic settings, scholars have demonstrated that cooperation on the efficient management of a renewable resource can be sustained by the threat of reverting to noncooperation in case of noncompliance to some agreed behavior (Cave 1987 Game theoretical predictions on questions of free riding and the management of the commons have received extensive attention by experimental economists. The early literature solely focused on static games (), repeated with non-renewable resources, or finite games (Herr et al. 1997 ). In general, findings tend to concur with the theoretical predictions, suggesting that free ridding and therefore inefficiencies do arise, and that dynamics help fostering the cooperative equilibrium through reputation mechanisms and the existence of latent punishment schemes. Exploring whether cooperation can be sustained in dynamic games of resource exploitation is a more challenging question (Frechette) that has only been tackled lately. Notice that the cooperative outcome can be sustained with several different subgame perfect punishments, hence compelling experimental economists to limit their experimental test to some specific strategies. Vespa (2014) shows that subjects tend to cooperate in a dynamic renewable CPR game if given the possibility to "ccoperate" or "defect" to the non-cooperative Markovian strategies. Yet such cooperation is jeopardized when subjects are offered the choice of a "highly profitable" deviation. These findings therefore seem to suggest that individuals do cooperate under the threat of some punishment strategies.
The punishment strategies described above rely on the dynamic nature of the game (). As a consequence, the picture changes if players are given the possibility to alter the nature of the game via their actions. Sekeris (2014) demonstrates that in a dynamic renewable (or not) CPR game where agents are given the choice to revert to violence at any point in time so as to claim ownership of the common resource, the efficient solution may not be sustainable at equilibrium. This follows from the players' incentives to violently appropriate the CPR when the resource becomes scarce, in turn making the non-cooperative punishments necessary to support cooperation not subgame perfect, and therefore invalidating the logic of Folk theorems. Given the important consequences such a reasoning may have regarding the conservation of resources vital to sustain human life, such as fresh water, land and fossil fuels, it is crucial to inquire whether individuals do act as the theory predicts.
In this paper we therefore experimentally explore whether the possibility of costly appropriation of a CPR modifies the incentives to cooperate. To that end we develop a simplified version of Sekeris (2014) that allows us to derive clear predictions regarding the players' optimal strategies. While in the absence of coslty appropriation of the CPR theory predicts that cooperation can be sustained at equilibrium, the introduction of the possibility of costly appropriation results in agents opting for non-ccoperation, and subsequently for costly appropriation. To experimentally evaluate the applicability of this theory, we design three treatments where two alternative control groups are either devoid of the possibility of using the costly appropriation option, or else are faced with a highly costly appropriation technology, and the main treatment group is offered the costly appropriation technology with a decreasing appropriation cost. Each treatment involves 58 participants, for a combined total of 156 undergraduate students from the University of York.
To emulate the infinite horizon environment required for folk theorems to be appliable, we follow the methodology of Vespa (2014) which was first introduced by Roth and Murnighan (1978) and later applied by Cabral et al. (2011) . The technique used is to introduce an uncertain time horizon by allowing the software to terminate the game at any 'time period' with some predetermined probability. This practicewhich in theory has been demonstrated to be equivalent to an infinite time horizon -has been shown not to be inocuous in practice (Dal bó 2005, Frechette and Yuksel 2014). Since both our control and treatment groups are subjected to the same random termination rule, the validity of our experiment is not jeopardized.
Participants are randomly matched in pairs, and are called to decide at each 'time period' the amount of 'points' to extract from a pool of points, given some pre-defined regeneration rate of the CPR. The first control group participants are given the possibility at each 'time period' to either extract a 'low' level of points matching the theoretical prediction of a cooperative extraction, or else a 'high' level of points matching the theoretical prediction of a non-cooperative (Markov-perfect) extraction. In the treatment group participants are given the additional possibility of opting for the 'chance' option whereby the CPR is equally split among participants at some cost which is decreasing in the stock of the CPR, and after chance has been played, the optimal extraction path is imposed on participants. To guarantee that any potential effect of the treatment is due to the theoretical mechanism we are proposing, we equally design a control group with the two same options as in the first control group (i.e. low and high extraction rates) and with a costly chance option. If the latter option is chosen, 40% of the CPR is destroyed, thus making that choice suboptimal for any level of resources. Admitedly, any difference between this control group and the chance option is necessarily attributed to our theoretical mechanism.
Our experimental findings support the theory of Sekeris (2014). Under the chance treatment the level of cooperation is lower compared to both control treatments, and non-cooperation is higher. Both the magnitude of the coefficients and the level of significance are larger when compared to the non-chance control treatment, thus signalling that part of the effect is driven by the very possibility of using the chance option -even when it is costly. The fact that cooperation is lower and non-cooperation larger in the chance treatment compared to the chance control treatment implies that the expectation of a higher likelihood of chance being played in the latter stages of the game reduces cooperation in favour of non-cooperation in the early stages of the game.
Restricting the analysis to the early rounds of the game (or alternatively to high levels of CPR) confirms that participants tend to non-ccoperate more in expectation of chance being potentially chosen in subsequent rounds.
In the following section we present a simpliied version of Sekeris (2014), in Section 3 we describe the experimental design, in Section 4 we present our experimental results, and lastly Section 4 concludes.
Theory
We consider a dynamic common pool resource game featuring a renewable resource, r t . Time is discrete and denoted by t = {0, 1 . . . ∞}. Two players labeled 1 and 2 simultaneously decide at each time period the amount of resources to exploit from the common pool of resources. The initial resouce endowment is given by r 0 and the resource regenerates at some linear rate γ|. Players costlessly invest effort in resource-use, so that player i's appropriation effort of renewable resources in time t is denoted by e i,t , with e i,t ∈ [0,ē],ē > r 0 .
Player i's associated consumption is given by x i,t such that:
if e 1,t + e 2,t ≤ r t e i,t e 1,t +e 2,t r t otherwise (1) The law of motion of resources is given by:
The instantaneous utility of any player i in time t is given by:
And the discounted life-time utility of player i in time period 0 equals:
Where δ designates the common discount rate.
We denote a strategy for player i as e i = {e i , t} ∞ t=0 .
Coperation
The "cooperative" solution to this game consists in both players choosing extraction rates that internalize the negative externality of resource depletion on the opponent. This amounts to optimizing the following problem:
s.t.
(1) and (2) The solution to this problem, the details of which can be found in the Appendix, is such that:
Or, defining by s c i the (constant) optimal extraction share of player i at any time period t, we have s
The discounted expected utility of both players following the cooperative strategy forever can be shown to equal:
non-cooperation
We next define as the non-cooperative strategy the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this dynamic game. Under noncooperation, the players therefore maximize equation (1) subject to the resource regeneration constraint without, however, conditioning their actions on the game's history. We denote the associated strategies by nc. In time period t, the maximization problem for player i therefore reads as:
(1) and (2) After optimizing, we obtain the equilibrium non-cooperative extraction rates:
Defining as in the cooperation case bys nc i the (constant) optimal extraction share of player i at any time period t, we have s
This enables us to compute the discounted expected utility of the non-cooperative SPE:
Cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria
The cooperative strategy yields -by construction -a higher discounted expected intertemporal utility for any given starting stock of resources. Yet, while by the very definition of a MPE it is a subgame perfect equilibrium as well, the cooperative solution is unstable since the instantaneous utility of deviating from the cooperative extraction rate is higher to the instantaneous utility of cooperating. A widespread strategy that supports the cooperative extraction path as a subgame perfect equilibrium consists in the Gimm-trigger strategy whereby any deviation from the cooperative action by either player implies both players reverting to the MPE forever after. One interesting question is to therefore unveil the conditions making the cooperative path of action a SPE. For cooperation to be sustained as a SPE the following condition must be satisfied:
It is shown in the Appendix that, after replacing for the appropriate terms, this expression can be written as:
Which is true for any δ > 1/2. We can therefore state the following result: Proposition 1. The cooperative extraction of resources is supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium by a trigger strategy of reversion to the Markov Perfect Nash strategy for any δ > 1/2
While this is not the only punishment supporting cooperation 1 , it is a particularly relevant punishment since the players in our experimental design will be given the opportunity to play the non-cooperative strategy. 1 In particular, the strategy of mutual full exhaustion of the resource is subgame perfect and constitutes the harshest possible punishment supporting the cooperative equilibrium for any (see Vespa 2014 and Sekeris 2014).
Cooperation and conflict
We now amend the standard tragedy of the commons framework by endowing the players with the capacity to revert to conflict at any time in order to appropriate part of the common resource and to manage the appropriated resource forever after as personal resource. We consider a very basic conflict technology that grants each player the control over half the resource stock from the time-period the conflict occurs onwards.
In this paper we abstract from modeling the arming process as in Sekeris (2014) and instead impose that conflict may be destructive, and that the resource resilience to conflict is described by some function φ(r t ) ∈
[0, 1], with φ(r t ) ' < 0 and such that ∃r > 0 such that φ(r) = 1, ∀r <r. 2 The modifed timing of actions is now such that:
1. The players simultaneously decide whether or not to declare conflict, in which case conflict ensues 2. The players simultaneously decide their extraction efforts Given this modifed setting, if either player declares conflict in time period t, the discounted expected utility of player i is given by:
Optimizing this expression with respect to x i,t yields:
Thus implying that along the optimal consumption path, Expression (13) can be written as:
To understand how the possibility of violently appropriating resources affects the game's equilibria we proceed in two steps. We first demonstrate that eternal cooperation is not achievable because through the dynamic depletion of the resource, the game reaches a point where both players prefer deviating from cooperation and reverting to conflict in the subsequent time period. In a second step we demonstrate that short-lived cooperation is not implementable either. 2 Notice that this set of simplifying assumptions on the con ict technology are meant to produce numerical results that can easily be mapped to the lab, while capturing the essence of Sekeris (2014) whereby the players' armaments and associated damage to the resource are endogenous. 
Substituting for the appropriate expressions and simplifying, this inequality can be reduced to:
This inequality holds for a range of (r t ; δ) values. To see this, observe that for the couple (r t ; δ) = (r; 1) this inequality is always verified. By continuity, there exists a couple (r t ; δ) satisfying the above inequality, where r t >r t and δ < 1.
Having shown that cooperation cannot be sustained forever, we now demonstrate that cooperation is not sustainable in the short run either. To establish this, we exploit the previous result according to which cooperation is not sustainable forever, together with the fact that for low levels of resources war is better than the discounted expected utility of non-cooperation. The latter result is proven by establishing that there exist values of r t satisfying the following inequality:
Replacing for the appropriate values and simplifying yields:
Replacing r t byr implies that the condition is satisfied for any δ.
Defining byr the maximal value of resources satisfying inequality (19), we show that for any resources r t >r players will play non-cooperatively. Assume that in period τ we expect conflict to be the most preferred option if both players cooperate. Then in t = τ − 1, should one's opponent play cooperatively, the best response is to play the non-cooperative best response. Hence, in t = τ − 1, both players will play non-cooperatively. This mutual noncooperation is due to the fact that in time τ players have no punishment scheme to support cooperation. Applying the argument backwardly implies that players never cooperate, hence the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In a depletable resource exploitation game where players can revert to violence to appropriate the common pool resource, the equilibrium is such that players exploit non-cooperatively the resource for r >r and they declare conflict for r ≤r.
3 Experimental design
Parametrization
For the experimental game, we fix the parameters of the model so that (i) cooperation is supported as a SPE in the conflict-free version of the game, and (ii) conflict is the players' preferred option when resources are sufficiently depleted, and therefore Proposition 2 is verified.
The unique required condition for (i) to hold is that δ > 1/2. We accordingly set the discount rate in the lab to δ = 0.7, and thus, the values of s c and s nc are respectively fixed at 0.15 and 0.23. The associated value of the non-cooperative best response to cooperation,
, is equal to 0.255.
Regarding the generation rate, we impose γ = 0.3.
Lastly, we give some structure to function φ(r t ) to be able to simulate payoffs. To keep figures simple, while satisfying the requirements of the model, we impose:
This implies that the threshold value of the CPR below which conflict is theoretically optimal is given byr = 29.15.
We impose as a starting stock r 0 = 40 for two reasons intimitely linked to the logarithmic nature of the utility function. On the one hand imposing a too high stock of resources would require the game to be played many periods for cooperation to yield higher payoffs than non-cooperation. Given, however, the random termination rule we are required to use for implementing a infinitely time horizon game, the likelihood of the game lasting sufficient periods for cooperation to be profitable becomes too small for participants to actually perceive the benefits of cooperating. On the other hand, setting a too low stock of resources would quickly make the period payoffs negative, and given the well-known losses-aversion of players (), even after adjusting the final payoffs for the participants' earnings to be in a reasonable range, the behaviour would be biased.
Design
We consider four different treatments each involving 58 participants. In each treatment, participants are randomly matched in pairs for the duration of a game consisting of a randomly determined number of rounds.
At the end of each match players are randomly re-assigned a pair. To implement an infinitely dynamic game in the laboratory, we follow the methodology of Vespa (2014) (2014), we impose that the 6 first rounds of each game are played with unit probability but the earned payoff is discounted at the constant discount rate of 0.7. From period 7 onwards, the software randomly terminates the game with a probability of (1 − δ) = 0.3. The rationale for adopting such a hybrid termination rule is that with a random termination rule the average length of a game would approximately equal 3.3 periods thus inducing the players not to cooperate despite the Pareto-superiority of cooperation. Imposing at least 6 rounds of certain play increases the average number of rounds played to 9.3, therefore correcting this bias. Indeed, on Figure1 we depict the cumulated payoffs under cooperation and non-cooperation, respectively, making it clear that if both players were to always cooperate cooperation would start dominating non-cooperation after round 5. In all treatments, participants begin each game with a common pool of 40 'points'. In the 'no-chance control' treatment, participants are given two extraction choices, either a 'high' extraction rate of a low one.
To capture the prisoner dilemma nature of the game, we respect the payoff structure of the theoretical model so that the (constant) shares of points being extracted for each combination of choices of paired participants is given by:
• If both play 'high': both extract 23% of the remaining coins.
• if a player opts fo 'low': he extracts 15% of the remaining coins irrespectively of the other player's extraction.
• if a plays 'high' and his match plays 'low': he extracts 25.5% of the remaining coins.
The 'chance' treatment offers the players the same choices to the ones described above, but on top of that the players can opt for 'chance' at any round of the game. If chance is selected, the CPR experiences losses described by function (20), the remaining stock of coins is shared equally among participants who then are imposed to extract the 'low' level for the current round and all subsequent rounds. Consistently with the theoretical findings, our expectations are that when confronted to this treatment, participants should be playing less cooperatively and more non-cooperatively in the game's early rounds, while chance should be selected approximately after the stock of points drops below 28.
The two treatments described above differ not only in the options given to the participants, but also in the number of choices offered. It could therefore be argued that when presented with an additional option in the 'chance' treatment, the level of cooperation will naturally decrease ceteris paribus if chance is to be played for any reason compatible or not with our theory. In order to curb such potential criticisms we implemented a second control treatment, the 'chance control' one. In the latter treatment, the players are confronted to the same three choices as in the 'chance treatment' one, with the difference that the cost of playing chance in terms of CPR losses equals 40% of the stock irrespectively of the amount of coins remaining. The 40% figure was selected both because it is high enough to make this choice suboptimal for any level of CPR, and because it is low enough to avoid participants being too harshly sanctioned (and potentially therefore obtaining negative payoffs) in case they were to opt for it.
On top of the instructions given to the participants (see Appendix), for each potential choice they could make at each round of the game, the screen indicated the amount of coins that would be available the next time period, for the various choices of the opponent. A screenshot of the 'chance' treatment is provided on In all treatments, the participants played 10 practice games, where for each game they were randomly re-matched, to get accustomed to the game. Then they played 10 games and were randomly re-matched after each game. To avoid participants adapting their strategies to the cumulated payoffs obtained during earlier plays of the game, at the end of the session 2 of the 10 games were randomly drawn and participants were paid... The sessions lasted approximately 120 minutes, we paid a show-up fee of £3, the average payment was £ and the variance of the earning equalled ...
Results
Before presenting the empirical results, some descriptive statistics may prove useful in grasping the participants' behaviour. On Figure 3 we depict the cumulated share of participants opting for cooperation across the three treatments. There is a marked difference across treatments, with cooperation being played at a higher rate -at any given round -in the no-chance-treatment (top discontinuous curve), and with cooperation being chosen less often in the chance treatment (bottom continuous curve). This very preliminary result concurs with our theoretical expectations: the anticipation of chance being played in either the chance-control or the chance treatments, reduces the propensity of players opting for cooperation. Moreover, the chance-control being sub-optimal, it is reasonable to expect players to anticipate chance being played more frequently in the chance treatment, and therefore to cooperate even less in the latter treatment.
The theoretical predictions are that cooperation should be substituted by non-cooperation when the CPR is relatively abundant. To see whether this is indeed the case, on Figure 4 we have plotted the cumulated share of participants opting for non-cooperation across the three treatments. Interestingly, the trend seems to mirror the cooperation rates, so that participants in the chance treatment are the less cooperative at all rounds, followed by the chance control treatment, and then by the no-chance-control treatment.
To convince the reader with this preliminary evidence that the differences in cooperation and noncooperation behaviour are intimately linked to the participants' propensity to resort to chance at later rounds of the game, on Figure 5 we have plotted the proportion of participants playing chance for the only two treatments where chance is permitted. There is a marked difference in the proportion with which chance is being played in the chance (continuous curve) and the chance-control (dotted curve) treatments, with participants in the former treatment being more willing to play chance at any round of the game, but perhaps more importantly, there is a striking difference in the evolution of these histograms through time. In the chance treatment we observe a sharp increase in round 3, which corresponds to the round where the level of coins is -on average -in the range where chance becomes theoretically optimal. Since chance is never optimal in the chance-control treatment, we should expect no similar pattern in the latter treatment and the Figure 5 seems to confirm that. On the other hand, under both treatments we observe an increase in the proportion of participants playing chance in later rounds. This behaviour follows from a sort of protection mechanism on behalf of the participants attempting to put an end to the depletion of the CPR. Indeed, under the chance treatment, when the game reaches round 14, the average round-payoff of non-cooperation becomes negative because of the low stock of remaining points coupled with the logarithmic of the earnings. In the chance-control treatment, this occurs already in round 9. Keeping in mind that these are average values, they are indicative that when the instantaneous payoffs enter the negative earnings zone, participants attempt stopping the negative trend by opting for chance, irrespectively of whether this yields higher payoffs or not.
We now complement this preliminary evidence with empirical material. We begin by comparing the effect of the introduction of the third option -chance -on the behaviour of participants. In Table 2 we are therefore regressing the chance treatment on the level of cooperation, where the control group is the no-chance-control one. To capture potential learning effects across games, we have included the game variable in the regression. Further, as our participants are undergraduate students, we control for the type of studies of the participants, namely hard sciences (science) and social sciences (social), with the residual group being humanities. Given the gender may influence the attitude of participants towards cooperation, and towards the chance option, we equally inculde the male variable in our model. Lastly to capture the downward trend of the stock of points, without however introducing an endogenous variablepoints -we include the round variable as well.
The first column of Table 2 reports the results of the benchmark specification, and as shown all coefficients are significant at the 1% threshold. Compared to the no-chance control, participants in the chance treatment tend on average to cooperate by 23.6 percentage points less, thus lending support to our theoretical findings. Given that the average level of cooperation in the no-chance-control treatment equals 37%, this implies that the introducing the possibility of sharing the resource at some possibly positive cost reduces the Cooperation is decreasing on average by 1 percentage points from one round to another inside a game. As will later become clear, this is mainly driven by participants increasingly reverting to conflict in the chance treatment, on the one hand, and by the participants increasingly reverting to non-cooperation when resources start running very low. Lastly, the gender and studies coefficients take the expected signs: male participants tend to cooperate less, and the same holds true for non-humanities students.
The effect of introducing the 'chance' option on cooperation, while indicative of a reduction of cooperation in the presence of the choice of violence, does not necessarily imply a reduction of non-cooperation, to the extent that the effect may be driven by a surge in the use of the third option which is unavailable in the no-chance-control group. Our main theoretical finding which is summarised in Proposition 2 stipulates that for high levels of resources (i.e. r > 28 given our parametrization) the optimal choice is to non-ccoperate, with the violent option being subsequently used once the resources are sufficiently depleted (r ≤ 28). To verify therefore that we indeed observe a substitution of cooperation by non-cooperation we restrict our estimation in multiple ways. In column 2 of Table 2 we restrict the sample to r > 28 to see whether for high levels of resources -where chance is unlikely to have been chosen -cooperation does decrease. Compared Figure 5 : Share of participants opting for chance to the benchmark estimation, the coefficient is marginally larger, thus implying that cooperation is indeed reduced compared to the no-chance-control treatment when resorting to violence is sub-optimal. Given, however that the level of resources is endogenous to the extraction rates of participants, in Columns 3 and 4 we, respectively, exclude the rounds where chance has been played, and on top of that also restrict the sample to the first 6 rounds of play where the random termination rule has not yet kicked in. The rational for excluding the rounds where chance has been played is to restrict the comparison of the no-chance-treatment to rounds in the treated group where only cooperation or non-cooperation have been chosen. The results further confirm that we are observing a substitution away from cooperation to non-cooperation in the chance treatment. Lastly, in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 we restrict the analysis to the first two and first three rounds, respectively. Given that all games begin with a stock of 40 points, in round 2 even if both players played 'high' in the game's first rounds, the stock of points will equal 28, making participants roughly indifferent between playing chance and not. For the same reason, it is more likely, but yet not very likely that chance be played in round 3. Cooperation in both regressions is significantly lower under the chance treatment -by 14.7 and 16.3 percentage points, respectively -thus further confirming our expectations.
In Table 3 we present the results of the same specification as in Table 2 by replacing the dependent variable by non-cooperation. The benchmark regression yields a negative coefficient which is significant at the 1% threshold: adding the chance option reduces non-cooperation on average by 27.3 percentage points compared to the no-chance-treatment. One may be tempted to interpret this result as the inclusion of the chance option leading to a reduction of both cooperation and non-cooperation in favour of chance, thus possibly contradicting Proposition 2. Such an interpretation would be mistaken, however, since the benchmark analysis considers the average effects of the introduction of violence in a CPR, while Proposition 2 clearly identifies two regions; one where non-cooperation should increase and another where violence should be the optimal choice. We therefore proceed in columns 2 − 6 to the same sample restrictions as in Table 2 . If Proposition 2 is to be verified, we would expect non-cooperation to increase when the stock of resources is abundant, or alternatively in the early rounds of the game. Our results confirm this prediction:
compared to the the no-chance-control treatment, non-cooperation increases by 11.9 percentage points in the game's first two rounds when participants are given the chance choice. Hence, the possibility of reverting to chance, at a possibly late stage of the game, incentivizes the participants to substitute cooperation by non-cooperation when the stock of resources is sufficiently large.
To provide additional evidence of this mechanism, we refer to Figure 5 . This figure clearly reveals that virtually no participant opts for chance in the first 2 rounds of the game, and we then observe a surge of chance in rounds 3 to 6, rising from it being played by 1.5% to 66% of the pairs. This coincides roughly with our expectation that conflict becomes optimal when the stock of points drops below 28, since the average stock of resources in rounds 2 and 3 equal 29 and 21.1 coins, respectively. Combined with the results of Tables 2 and 3 we can confidently state that the introduction of the violent appropriation option in an experimental game of renewable CPR exploitation incentivizes participants to become more noncooperative in the presence of abundant resource stocks, thus precipitating their depletion, and eventually opting for the (violent) partition of the resource.
To further convince the reader that it is indeed the expectation of violence that triggers non-cooperation in the game's early rounds, we propose two additional sets of specifications.
If participants decide to use the violent appropriation option at some stage of the game, it is reasonable to assume that they are aware in earlier rounds that they are likely to do so in the same game's later rounds. In other words, when restricting the sample of the 'chance treatment' to the participants that actually made use of the chance option during the game, we should expect these participants to be less cooperative and more non-cooperative throughout the game compared to the results of Tables 2 and 3 where the chance treatment group is considered as a whole. To capture this effect, in Table 6 we restrict the chance treatment group to the game-participant instances where the selected participants chose chance. We then re-estimate the propensity of these participants cooperating, and their propensity to play the Markov perfect equilibrium strategy as compared to the no-chance-control treatment. We should expect less cooperation from these participants.
Interestingly, all coefficients of the first row of columns 1 − 5 of Table 6 are significant at the 1% threshold level, and are more negative than the corresponding coefficients of Table 2 , hence supporting our intuition.
Moreover, the positive effect of this restriction on the level of non-cooperation as captured by the first row of columns 6 − 10 of Table 6 is equally larger than the corresponding coefficients in Table 3 , confirming our expectations as well.
As a last test to support our theoretical mechanism, in Table 7 we show that participants that have been subjected to violence in the previous game become less cooperative. More specifically, in the first panel of Table 7 we replicate Table 2 by adding as explanatory variables a dummy capturing whether a participant has played chance in the previous game (lagged attacker) and another dummy capturing whether a participant was subject to an attack in the previous game (lagged victim). The results in Column 1 suggest that when the stock of resources is higher than 28 points, individuals who triggered conflict in the previous game cooperate by 10 percentage points less than the average participant in the chance treatment, while the equivalent figure for participants that were victims of violence in the previous game equals 8.5 percentage points. This marked difference between subjects not experiencing violence in the previous game, and the ones involved in violent confrontations, and thus more likely to expect conflict in the future seems therefore to be driving the participants' increased reluctance to cooperate. Imposing the same sample restrictions as in the previous analyses in columns 2 − 5 leaves the result qualitatively unaffected, thus further strengthening our interpretation. In Column 6 we have estimated the equivalent coefficients when the Markov perfect equilibrium action is the dependent variable: compared to the average behaviour of the chance treatment group, the increase in non-cooperation among lagged attackers equals 7.9 percentage points, and among lagged victims it equals 8.9 percentage points. Thus, we can confidently deduce that participants that have been either more violent in the previous game, or more subject to violence, have higher expectations of conflict occurring, and are therefore substituting non-cooperation to cooperation when resources are still abundant. Again, extending the analysis to alternative sample restrictions in Columns 7 − 10 leaves the results qualitatively unaffected.
One potential criticism we ought to consider at this stage is that the no-chance-control treatment and the chance treatment do not feature the same number of choices. Accordingly, on could argue that the very existence of a third option, whether relevant or not, increases the likelihood of that option being playedpossibly even by mistake -thereby triggering more non-cooperation in the chance treatment. A reasonable answer to this criticism is that participants seem to opt for the chance option when that option becomes optimal. To further convince the reader that our results do not depend on this feature of the treatments,
we designed an additional chance-control treatment where participants equally have three choices, namely 'low', 'high', and 'chance', but where the cost of chance is purposefully kept at a level making that option suboptimal throughout the game. In Tables 4 and 5 we we-estimate Tables 2 and 3 after substituting the chance-control group to the no-chance-control group.
All the results obtained with the no-chance-control treatment remain qualitatively verified when using the chance-control group as the control treatment. On the other hand, the magnitude of all the relevant coefficients is smaller: while cooperation decreased by 14.7 percentage points and non-cooperation increased by 14.2 percentage points in the game's two first rounds with the no-chance-control as the control treatment group, with the chance-control as the control treatment group these coefficients both drop to 11.9 percentage points. The reason for this drop becomes apparent by looking at Figures 3-5 where we compare the proportion of participants opting for cooperation, non-cooperation, and chance, across treatments, and across rounds. The costly and inefficient chance option in the chance-control treatment is chosen by participants, and especially so in the game's late rounds. While in rounds 3 and 4, 1.5 and 2.5 percent of the participants opted for this costly chance option respectively, around round 13 an increasingly larger share of participants started opting for chance, eventually reaching the 20% figure. The puzzling fact that chance is opted for despite it being sub-optimal is probably due to some psychological mechanism whereby participants seeing their instantaneous payoffs becoming negative as the number of rounds played becomes large, have the (mistaken) belief that the losses will be contained when putting an end to the strategic interaction by playing chance. The comments provided by participants to the feedback questionnaires seems to confirm this. The second observation is that compared to the no-chance-treatment, participants in the chance-treatment tend to substitute cooperation by non-cooperation in the game's early rounds. Our interpretation is in line with the mechanism behind our theoretical findings. By the time participants are exposed to the real treatments, they have already played 10 practice games, and are therefore aware that in the even the game lasts many rounds the chance option will increasingly be chosen. Anticipating that conflict may eventually be played, the participants have increased incentives not to cooperate in the game's early rounds. The fact that this effect of future conflict results in a smaller decrease of cooperation and in a smaller decrease of non-cooperation as compared to the chance treatment follows (i) from the lower expectation that conflict will be played under the chance-control treatment, and (ii) from the expectation that if conflict is to be played it will be so at a latter round of the game, thus creating a feeling of safety in the initial rounds of the game.
Conclusion
Folk theorems have been theoretically and experimentally shown to permit cooperation to arise at equilibrium in dynamic common pool renewable resource games. Allowing the players to revert to violence to share the resource and to thereafter manage efficiently what has become a private resource disrupts the logic of folk theorems. In our theoretical section we propose a stylised version of Sekeris (2014) and assume that the costs of conflict are an increasing function of the size of the resources stock. In such settings, infinite horizon dynamic games may endogenously become finite horizon strategic games up to the moment conflict emerges, after which the problem stops being strategic and instead becomes decision theoretic. In this paper we experimentally inquired whether participants respond to such incentives that should lead to (i) less cooperation in the presence of high stocks of resources, and (ii) conflict after the resource stock is sufficiently depleted. We find a strong and highly significant effect of the introduction of conflict as a potential choice, on top of the two choices available in the control group: the efficient extraction rate, and the noncooperative (Markovian) extraction rate. In the early rounds of the game (i.e. first two round), participants reduce their cooperation by 14.7 percentage points and increase non-cooperation by 14.2 percentage points.
Given that the average rates of cooperation and non-cooperation in the game's two first round are around 34% and and 66% respectively, this equates, to a 43.1% decrease of cooperation, and to a 21.5% increase of non-cooperation.
To exclude the possibility of our results being driven by the fact that in the control treatment participants had one option less than under the conflict scenario, we equally compare our results to a treatment featuring the same three options as in the conflict scenario, with the difference that we impose a (theoretically)
prohibitive cost of conflict. The results remain qualitatively the same since in the conflict scenario , in the early rounds of the game cooperation decreases by more than 11.9 percentage points and non-cooperation increases by the same percentage points. We attribute the reduced magnitude of the coefficients to the fact that in this control group where conflict is prohibitively costly, participants nevertheless did resort to it when the stock of resources ran very low in an (irrational) attempt to halt the degradation of resources. The expectation of conflict therefore pushed participants to lower their levels of cooperation, but to a lesser degree than in the main conflict treatment, where conflict is played both more frequently and in earlier rounds of the game.
This contribution constitutes the first evidence that the fear of -possibly distant -conflicts over shared resources can hamper cooperation in the short run, and thereby accelerate the depletion of the resources.
Our findings may help comprehend the failure to reach agreements over such things as the conservation of the environment. This in turn would imply that one crucial dimension for promoting cooperation would be the strengthening of institutions and international bodies able to contain such violence.
5 Appendix A: Results In this section we present the instruction handed to the chance treatment alone. The chance-control group received the same instructions, with the difference that the cost of chance was maintained equal to 40% of the resources throughout, while the no-chance-treatment was presented with the two choices 'low' and 'high' alone.
no-conflict-control treatment
Welcome,
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making. You will be paid for your participation in cash, privately, at the end of the session. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
Please turn off all electronic devices now.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals. Please do not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants until everybody has been told that the experiment is over and that you can leave the room.
We will now give you some time to carefully read the following instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and your question will be answered so everyone can hear.
Overview & Payment
In this experiment you will play the same game 10 times. Each time you play, the computer will randomly pair you up with someone else in the room (but you don't know with whom). So, in each game you are paired with a random person in the room. The first 2 games you play will be for practice. The remaining 8 games will be for real.
Each game lasts for at least 6 rounds. After the 6 th round, you will enter each next round with a probability of 70% (so with a 30% probability the game ends). So, if you happen to enter round 7, there is a 70%
share that you will enter round 8 and so on and so forth.
When you have played the game 10 times, each game lasting 6 or more rounds, you will be paid. Your payment has two components, an initial endowment of £5 and a payment of £1.50 per point won. To establish how many points you have won, we will randomly draw 2 of the last 10 games (the for-real games) you played and pay you according to the amount of points you won in those games. So, your final payment will be your initial endowment plus your points payment.
If you choose low but your opponent chooses chance, then you are in chance mode. What this means is described below.
High:
If you choose high and your opponent chooses low, you take 25.5% of the points (25.5% of 40 points = 10.2) and your opponent takes 15% of the points (15% of 40 points = 6).
If you choose high and your opponent chooses high too, you each take 23% of the points (23% of 40 points = 9.2 points).
If you choose high but your opponent chooses chance, then you are in chance mode (described below).
Chance:
If either you or your opponent pick chance, then both of you will be in chance mode.
If one of you has played chance, (so that you are both in chance mode) you will each take 15% of the stock in all of the remaining rounds. As explained more in detail below, the total number of points you will collect is entirely left to chance under this scenario since you will not be making any more decisions after picking this option.
Playing chance is costly. Once chance is chosen, a cost will be taken away from your joint stock. The cost is a one-off loss of points, so it will only be applied once when you enter chance mode, but not in There is more to know about your choices:
The points that you take from the current stock each round are not exactly the points that you get to keep.
There is a formula, which describes how many points you get to keep each round.
This will involve some mathematics, i.e. the natural logarithm. If you don?t like maths, don?t worry about understanding what logarithm means. All you need to know is that the natural logarithm of something is quite a bit less than that something.
Anyway, the following table shows how this works. In round 1 you get to keep the natural logarithm of the points you decide to take. In round 2 you get 70% of the natural logarithm of the points you take.
In round 3, you get to keep 70% of 70% of the natural logarithm of the points you took, and so on and so forth. (Note that "ln" just means natural logarithm.)
Round
Points you get to keep 1 ln(points you take) =ln(points you take) 2 70% × ln(points you take) =70% × ln(points you take) 3 70% × 70% × ln(points you take) =49% × ln(points you take) 4 70% × 49% × ln(points you take) =34% × ln(points you take) 5 70% × 34% × ln(points you take) =24% × ln(points you take) 4 70% × 24% × ln(points you take) =17% × ln(points you take)
Here are two examples:
Suppose you are in round 1, where your current stock is 40. If you both chose low, the points you would take would be 15% of 40 points (i.e. 6 points) each. But you would only get to keep ln(points you take), which is ln(6) ≈ 1.79.
Suppose again that you are in round 1, where your current stock is 40. If you chose low and your opponent chose high, you would again take 15% of 40 points (i.e. 6 points) and your opponent would take 25.5% of 40 points (i.e. 10.2 points). Here you would only get to keep ln(points you take), which is ln(6) ≈ 1.79 and your opponent would get to keep ln(10.2)?2.32. Now, if you remember, after round 6 there is only a 70% probability of getting into each subsequent round. To be precise, at the end of each round after round 6 the computer software will roll a virtual, 100-sided dice and will end the game if a number higher than 70 comes up on that virtual dice.
This has an effect on the points you get to keep from round 7 onwards. From Round 7 onwards, you and your opponent can make the same choices as previously but now you continuously get to keep 17% of the natural logarithm of the points you take for each additional round played. 
This is what your screens look like:
The following picture shows you what your first screen will look like. The grey buttons are your choices.
The purple boxes display the points you get to keep, the yellow boxes display the points your opponent gets to keep. The little grey boxes show you what your next stock will be if you were to make that choice.
The big grey boxes show you what either player would get if you were to choose chance.
If you click a choice button, a red frame will appear around the choice that you have picked (see image).
If you click on the "chance" choice-button, a box will appear next to it. It tells you what the cost of choosing chance would be, if you chose it in your current round. The following screenshot gives an example:
Of course, you do not know what your opponent?s choice will be until the next round, so do not wait for him/her.
At the bottom of the screen there is a red OK button. You ought to press it in order to confirm your choice and enter the next round.
Finally, the following picture shows the screen you would get if either of you were to choose chance; it shows you what chance mode looks like:
Stock:
Now, there is a little more to know about the stock of points. First, depending on the choices made, the stock decreases in size. But second, it also replenishes. It regrows by 30% each round. This is how the next stock of points is calculated:
1. Current stock ? points you take ? points opponent takes = remaining stock This is it. Good luck!
